

Reforms of the State

Contemporary several phenomena at world level point out a tendency to the redefinition of the pattern of State-Nation and a consequent crisis of the liberal democracy, in what seems the culmination of several centuries of modernization, without the basic goals of well-being proposed have been completed by the modernity. Very well Hobsbawm, when making the history of the XX (from 1914 at 1991) century offers a synthesis of the causes of what could call it is eclipsed of the State-Nation like historical fellow in our time

The contemporary State is no longer able to guarantee the security that it offers to the citizens in exchange for its obedience. Neither it assumes their paper in the redistribution of the social wealth, delegating their functions to the market, which doesn't spread to the justice as moral central value but to the mere gain. Also, the State is reduced to the impotence in front of the enormous pressures mobilized by the global economy, which is developed on the base of multiplying inequalities. The international growing juridical commitments that make a pact the States, and its every time bigger indifference to assume tasks that retained as essentials (for example postal services or of security) in another time are samples of the respective loss of sovereignty "for up" as well as (toward the international sphere) "for below" (toward the mercantile society).

To final of our century, the State-Nation is "to the defensive", exactly when its resolved intervention becomes more necessary to control the social dysfunctions that the market generates and to palliate the environmental risks. If everything it one can affirm for the advanced countries, to fortiori (with more reason) it is valid in the dependent countries and of limited development, like it is our case in the Andean group and Mercosur and Union of American countries. In almost all the countries of Latin America a crisis of State has been given. But here and there "contradictions and impasses are evidenced in the reformations of the State" (Cándido Grzybowski).

Starting from the decade of the years 80, two crisis types have induced in several countries reformations of the State: a mainly economic crisis in States that they came applying a model of development (it could be the case of big economies as those of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile); a political crisis, of kind of a "collapse of State" amid a quite positive acting of the economy (case Colombia); or a mixture of both crises (case Peru and according to some analysts, the case Venezuela).

But when we are not only in Venezuela in front of a dilemma of reformations but of revolution, a debate on the topic cannot be slanted neither in favor of economic simple changes neither in favor of political simple changes. The historical cycle that we live comes us pushing toward the market and toward the democracy. ¿How to respond institutionally to both pressures? it is what should intend all Reformation or Revolution of the State according to the circumstances of the country. The challenge is not easy and it is complex, since the dynamics of a process of democratization of the political régime spreads to be politically including (that it opens up for all); while the process of modernization of the State, especially with economic urgency, it spreads to be socially excluding (that it finishes not favoring all, but to the population's minority and privileged sectors).

Let us don't forget that all Reformation or Revolution should be to the service of the Modernization. If it is necessary to recover the State, to make it bigger or smaller, it is to secure and to make more effective and more governable to the democracy. This can sound 'anachronic', in a time in the one that has dominated the speech in favor of the "minimum State". The application of our theoretical focus should advance balanced between two biases: one minimalist of neo-liberal court that wanted to dismount or to reduce the beneficent State, enlarging the reach and the functions of the Market; and another maximalist, of developmental court and socialist that it would want to not only maintain for the State a high control and address of the economic processes but in general lifelong of the national community.

Being about applying the political theory to the concrete Venezuelan case should notice three things. In the first place it is necessary to recognize that the State

continues being inevitably necessary. Not only for the main role that the State has played up to now in the development of our society, but because the same character of highly dependent country (and economy), with gigantic challenges that the economic same development goes us outlining, it makes unavoidable (as not well smaller) that the State not only assists to the economic phenomena of recession or hyperinflation but to the whole "social question", and that it exercises its non replaceable paper of regulator of conflicts and guarantor - administrator of a social order. But, in second place, it would be necessary to determine which it is the type of State that is desirable to build or to strengthen or to redraw in Venezuela.

From a conception of State - that continues being valid and current - the organizational aspect of the State and its control capacity on the territory and the population, acquires special relevance. The contemporary State should continue being a permanent and differentiated group of institutions (administrative, bureaucratic, legal, extractive, distributive and coercive), exercising the monopoly of collective norms, thanks to the back that grants it the full control of the means of violence and coercion. The strength of the State, depends in great measure of its capacity to penetrate the civil society indeed, of its capacity to organize this society and to implement the political decisions to the long and wide of its own territory. This statement of the State (in kind of a task infra-structural) doesn't mean us to plead for an overbearing power of the State. Neither the strength of the State to exercise its high-priority tasks necessarily implies that the State should be a big elephant. The ideal formula would be the sum of a light State and of an effective State, adapted to the identity and characteristic of the People, as Bolivar always wanted it.

Jorge Schaerer, commercial attaché from Chile in Hong Kong who has been in "the eye of the hurricane" of the Chinese gigantic modernization for more than two decades, he said in an interview: "¿of what modernization of the State are we speaking? ¿That the State comes undone of companies that are extremely profitable for the Revenue? But nobody worries about the real modernization that is the adaptation from the State to the necessity of current operation, so that it is really functional in their structure to the necessities of the country."

And, as third element, in a democratic conception of reformation or revolution of the State, a simultaneous invigoration of the civil society is also required. As well Boisier, "the political reformation has said it looks for to achieve two fundamental purposes: to improve the governance of the political own systems; and to apply a new arrangement of responsibilities between the State and the civil society".

Lastly, let us don't forget that all change to improve the State should be accompanied by a rescue of the ethical-social values that compensates the tendency to focus the attention in values singular (family, sex, money...), typical of kind of an individualistic and postmodern anarchism. In short, they are two the big values that they owe to meet if we want to configure for Venezuela a "modern and intelligent" State, that is: the *subsidiarity* like principle rector of the organization of the society and the *solidarity* that allows that other reforms and the decentralization work.