

Gusty future

The material facts, more the elements of scientific reflection that we consign in the previous pages, leave us before a threshold of uncertainty in front of the events that can happen in next years. We leave the past sadly and we don't still advance confidently toward the future. Three authorized historians (Ramón J. Velásquez, Elías Pino Iturrieta, Arístides Medina Rubio) they were summoned so that with their reflections they contribute to respond the collective question on what moment of the Venezuelan history we are reviving nowadays (*El Nacional*, 13 December 2002).

- For Velásquez, the present days they "bring to the memory José Ruperto Monagas's dangerously confused days, with the bands of 'lincheros' (abusers) of Santa Rosalía [...], or also those days of Venezuela without direction (September and October of 1899) with the three armies like in candle of weapons: Andrade's yellow liberals, Mocho Hernández's nationalists and the Andean 'tachirenses' of Cipriano Castro, in the historical scenario of Maracay [...] Of the past it seems to resuscitate hirsute Venezuela, dominated by the blind and incessant violence that it came to close its cycle July 21 1903 in the battle of City Bolívar."

- For Medina, this is "again time of crisis that, like in the previous opportunities, it won't be solved in a short time and without patches. Again we are in time of contradictions and conflicts, of mobilization and conspiracies and hopefully it is frozen the time of the war forever".

- For Pine, "lifting the mask of the past reappears José Tadeo Monagas's face, being proclaimed owner of the country and erasing the prints of the citizenship that it had begun to flourish before his ascent. It reappears the scorn of the institutions, the jeer of the people, the proclamation of a man of weapons superior and feared, the Kingdom of the corruptions, the attack of the political parties, the arrogance and the ignorance reigning in the domes. Perhaps be that

first bossy of our history the one resuscitated of nowadays. And perhaps be the miseries of their time those that reappear now. Suddenly what happens today seems a tracing of those unfortunate days, as if the almanac had stopped between 1846 and 1858." "But equally they are part of the retinue of the deceaseds who they get better to give him another time the fight to a anachronic José Tadeo and to all that represents." "Of that which you could deduce that they have recovered validity today two essential ingredients of the past: the primitive antirrepublic and the promising republicanism".

In other observers' opinion, we are before a pot of pressure. "Nobody knows which the exit can be to the current crisis that confronts the country because everything, in good part, depends on the unforeseeable president Hugo Chavez [...] This is a very weak country with a very weak Government whose force depends on the weakness of the society. I don't see an exit to the political crisis if the public powers are not changed" (Ramón Piñango, *El Nacional*, 21 April 2002).

This reality of a civil weak society, every day more kidnapped by a 'revolutionary' project of autocratic dominance that continues advancing in zigzags, it has been very noticed by one of the most serious analysts that has the country (S.A. Consalvi, *El Nacional* 18 May 2003):

In front of a project of autocratic dominance that advances in a sustained way, against wind and it gets dizzy, and that it goes occupying all the instances of the State, we have a civil flimsy society and some parties that seem unable to overcome their crises. We have factors of power that have confused their roles. In front of an almighty Government that manages the resources of the State without scruples of any nature, that acts without the controls and the balances of the democratic régimes, that it cultivates the secret and it advances in the consolidation of the project, the dispersion of the national other factors is remarkable. The 'revolutionary'

Government it uses all the resources of the State to kidnap to the own State and to maintain to line to the civil society.

This reality projects toward ghosts and storms. 'For the time being' you don't leave a next solution to the deep crisis that is outlined in the country. Anyway, it will be enormous the cost of the exit, anyone that it is. But it continues being guessed right and applicable to current Venezuela the Israeli statesman Abba Eban's fleshed observation (25 July 1955): "The men and the nations behave wisely, once they have drained all the other alternatives."

We outline, in the following pages, four possible scenarios on what can be the gusty future of a country in which leave gestating different solution options, all conditioned to a fluctuating one to become of internal and external actors, of national and international factors, of unpredictable joints. We will notice the strengths and weaknesses of each scenario, pointing to their adult or smaller viability in the practice, from our current observation moment (2007).

¿Hardening of the process?

The victory of the NO against the IF in the abrogative presidential referendum of August 15 2004; the result of the regional elections for governors and mayors of the past October 31 2004, and for the deputies to the National Assembly (4 December 2005, with a gigantic abstention of 76%), they left colored of red the whole map of Venezuela -to exception of two islands, the oil region of Zulia and that of Margarita (New Esparta). These results would propitiate a hardening of the process. Radical sectors of the 'chavism' they plead for a bigger repression, for a bigger hegemony of the already existent and an increase of the action of the Powers Legislative, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral in favor of the Executive so that it has just eliminated the havens enemy survivors of the passing 'oligarchy' that 'so much wrong made to Venezuela'. "I predict more hegemony, more 'sectarism'; and then, enough decomposition and demoralization in the chavist clientele" (Ibsen Martínez, *El Nacional*, 10 October 2004).

The editor of *El País* (Madrid, 1° May 2005) consigned that "Hugo Chávez has accumulated, through successive popular elections or consultations, more power of the one that had been able to dream. This domain without counterbalances is what impels the populist commander's authoritarian alarming drift".

As a confirmation of this line of radical hardening, it comes being pointed out with justified apprehension, for several countries of the region, the one accelerated and expensive arms career in that has gone aboard the régime with purchases to Russia (100.000 model rifles AK 103, 5.000 Dragonovs, 10 helicopters and several submarines), to Spain (10 airplanes of military transport, 8 patrol crafts of height), to Brazil (20 airplanes Super Tucano), to China (3 three-dimensional radars of long reach), to Iran diverse missiles.

But he well notices a noted one academic Heinz Sonntag (in the best line of the Marxist great strategist's thought of Antonio Gramsci) that the hegemonies are stable only when there are contrabalances with those which to fight, because they stay this way with challenges and live. But when the hegemony takes all the institutions and it controls all the power, this petrifies, it atrophies and finally it collapses. "To the chavism it can pass as the USSR that the hegemony petrified and it broke when conquering all the institutions."

The collapse of the communist world is a historical very exemplary event. For its long permanency (70 years); its economic, social and military organization; its political strong system of Unique Party (to its control didn't escape any factor of the national life), it could be thought that was dedicated to last. And however it collapsed from inside of, as other authoritarian radical régimes (mainly those of populist court) in those that the economic bases crumble at least. First it is usually the economic collapse and later the political collapse. "There is not bad that 100 years neither body that it resists it lasts".

Fortunately in the decade of the 80, it didn't clot the tragic admonition that the English novelist George Orwell had made in its titled work *1984*, in which

predicted that for this year "Big Brother" would have implanted a totalitarian and dehumanizing domain in the whole globe. It happened just the opposite. The communist and atheistic totalitarianism that seemed unassailable from inside (given its total control of the society) and unbeatable from outside (given its military and nuclear might), it began to wobble from 1985 and it collapsed boisterously in the 89. Stalin's gigantic statue that presided over per years the central square of Tirania, capital of Albania (the one of the more stridently communist countries), it resembled a lot the overpowering famous statue of Nabucodonosor that describes us the book of Daniel's Apocalypse (that we already mention previously). The gigantic statue, in spite of its head of gold, silver chest and steel thighs, began to fall when crumbling its ceramic foot. That foot on which should lean on all political system that we call popular will of those forced to obey.

Hurricanes of freedom began to travel from 1989 the communist countries that rotated around the political Soviet system. It began a 'revolution of the mind', as Gorbachev he called it speaking with John Paul II the 1st December of 1990. It produced events in progressively growing speed. In 10 years, in Poland, the Solidarity union finished taking the place of the communist régime. In 10 months, in Hungary, Communist Party changed its name and its symbols and it adopted those of a socialist democratic party. In 10 weeks, in Germany, it lay down the wall of Berlin, the door of Brandenburg opened up and they could circulate the citizens of both Germanies freely, changing the régime. In only 10 days, in old Checoeslovaquia, the "Spring of Prague" that had been squashed in 1968 by the Soviet tanks flourished again. And in 10 hours, in Rumania, it was shot the tyrant Ceaucescu, very seated per years thanks to the force of repressive Securitate.

¿Appeal to the Heaven?

John Locke's classic Second Test on the civil Government's original and final true extension (Britannica Great Books, London, vol. 35, pages 25-81), it continues

constituting a reliable breviary to judge of the mutual dependence among being able to political and civil society, as well as of the relationships that it should have among the public powers. It is applicable to a current democracy. The chapter 19 and last he dedicates it to the Government's Breakup, and there he meditates on three possible alternatives. Speaking of the last one, an extreme case "in the one that the leader or who is in charge of the administration, decline the road of subjecting the serious differences then to the appropriate referee that is the body of the people, it is not another resource that to appeal to the Heaven (*the appeal then lies nowhere but to Heaven*)."

The eufemistic or metaphoric form that Locke uses signals to leave the door open to what the common sense and a long jurisprudence recognize as the "right of civil resistance" to the oppression of the rulers. It is the right to the popular insurrection as last resource in the face of the despotism of a government that breaking serious and continuously the constitutional conventional contract with its people. Expressly it recognizes this way the article 350 of the political current Constitution (1999) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela:

"The people of Venezuela, faithful to their republican tradition, to their fight for the independence, the peace and the freedom, they will ignore any régime, legislation or authority that it thwarts the values, principles and democratic guarantees or impair the human rights".

This intent of summoning to a civil massive disobedience against Chávez's régime, confiscating this way his 'revolution', it can seem brave, and patriotic. But it has little of political realism and of viability. The enormous weakness and fragmentation of the civil current society doesn't allow to omen success to a challenge of this type in Venezuela. It is not enough to evoke the expression of independence of India in front of the British colossal empire, under the guide of an almost naked small man (Gandhi) and his victorious politics of "no-violence". Neither Mandela's geste conquering for the black ones all their rights in Sudafrica, in front of the "apartheid" imposed by white dominant sectors.

The failure of the actions attempted up to now, doesn't guarantee a coming success. And it gives, on the other hand, that the régime presses the nuts of an institutional and army repression. The national blackout of 65 days (2001-2002), the 'cacerolazos' (noise of saucepans) with a lot of noise and few nuts, the gigantic street manifestations, the episode that took to apparent renouncement of the President (11 April 2002), the one carried out of the abrogative referendum of the presidential command (15 August 2004), and many other bankrupt actions constitute an exemplary precedent for the forces of opposition.

The National (FAN) Armed force is more and more controlled by the Boss and won with ascents, positions and material benefits for the process, so somewhere around there is not crack with which could count some irregular movement opponent.

The old political parties have just to be renewed and to be reorganized, they don't have old popular grabs and they seem some sleepless zombies. Their leaders continue with the same improper habits and search of individual interests that it impeded in almost all the regional States that they were with unified and clever candidates to face those red ones in the regional and municipal last elections (31 October 2004). And many analysts consider it was a great error of the opposition not to have gone with lists unified to the elections for deputies to the National Assembly (4 December 2005), leaving the whole table served to the official line, after the call at the last moment to the non vote.

Appealing to actions of criminal violence is to begin an escalade of armed violence that one knows where it begins but not where it can arrive in an infernal hairspring of violence. Until a civil war it would rot prospect to the long one in the political horizon of this highly polarized country. And a civil war implies to pay the price of millions of dead, what nobody wants.

Another consideration that should take into account, when propitiating this initially peaceful road of civil rebellion against the régime, is the

probability that an eventual external intervention of effective (and maybe military) support existed to the democratic forces, invoking the Democratic Letter of America. But neither OEA (that it doesn't have intervention instruments), neither the UN (that in more serious cases of violation of human rights or subversion against legitimate rulers, difficultly it sends their blue helmets), neither the United States of America (when they face strong rejections at the moment for their unilateral interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq) can be thought that welcome to act in an adventure of this type, in a country that doesn't represent a lot for them outside of the petroleum. The hypothesis is, because, discarded.

¿Revolution in the revolution?

Isolated voices and young groups with mystic discharge, propose a "revolution in the revolution" that allow to decant the gold of the scum, to separate the leaders and militant genuinely committed of the thousands of upstart and opportunists that have been mounted in the triumphant car of the 'revolution'.

A "revolution in the revolution" it was tried to give in Iran, in 1997, with the intelligent conduction, persistent in his objectives and flexible in his methods, of Mohamed Jatami, to the one who the president Chávez visited November 27 2004. But the 8 year-old effort in such an address one came below with the election (June 2005) of the lay radical and fundamentalist, Ahmadinejad, supported by the Islamic powerful Ayatollahs from Iran.

The effort of Jatami and his followers (with majority in the Parliament) consisted on putting an end to the religious fundamentalism that it came confiscating the revolution through the mullahs; and to establish a full right State, pluralism of parties, the opinion freedom and of press, the right of the intellectuals and of the innovators to the critic, a bigger access of the women to

the positions of responsibility. But we already know, this intent of opening of a fundamentalist revolution in Iran, hardly lasted 8 years. The pointers of the clock returned behind.

How so viable it is for Venezuela this exit type? It could be the best, and in any event, it would be the most peaceful, democratic and republican. But they lack pieces to arm the puzzle, mainly the commander's necessity that, with vision and strong pulse, could assume the coup of rudder in consonance with the will of most of the people. And the inertia of radical and fundamentalist forces that return to the scenario to stay weighs (case Iran).

* It could be thought that nobody better than same Chavez, with all the reins of the power and the gigantic resources of petrodollars in his hands, his wide popularity and the clarity that he should have at this time that the country claims a coup of rudder that corrects serious errors and failures of the 'revolution' just as it has come implementing up to now. An economic, social, political and international change of steering wheel would find great back in the interior and external of the country. And it would consecrate him as the great Commander of the XXI century for Venezuela: 1) who was able to dismount 40 years of a corrupt, inefficient and unjust system; and 2) able to build and to put to work in democracy another transparent, efficient system and of social great justice, a type of democratic and liberal socialism. The same thing, but in superlative grade, it would had happened to Castro in Cuba when the collapse in 1989 of the "real socialism" in the popular democracies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If he had headed the return then to the democracy and a mixture of Socialism with Market, Castro had passed doubly to the history: First) for his revolution in the island and cavalier Pygmy fight in front of the North American colossal empire, and Second) for the construction of a social new democracy, retaining the above-mentioned achievements and chord with the new times, for benefit of all the Cubans (those of inside and the other half of outside). The excessive attachment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the predominantly militarist mentality and the personal authoritarian style didn't allow to Fidel Castro in his moment, and it seems they don't allow now Hugo

Chávez (his great pupil and follower) to attempt a "revolution in the revolution."

* It has already advanced too much the corruption. The big interests and appetites of the managerial-administrative environment that it surrounds him, make very difficult a surgery and extirpation of the wicked tumors that the broth of cultivation of the 'revolution' it has generated. It is an unlikely feat to turn the "establishment", against the same ones that are controlling it up and enjoying it.

* The petroleum, with an international price of \$70 barrel average -and soon the natural gas, with its big locations-, they assure fiscal enormous revenues to the Government. It doesn't feel, because, the necessity of a coup of rudder, since it can continue being financed per years the errors, inefficiency and broken veins of the country.

* Last, but not that of smaller importance, if he is not same Chavez the helmsman that primes the direction correction, it does not leave in the horizon to medium term, the alternative of somebody who can make it. The gerontocracy of the parties impeded possible statesmen and intermediate generations their access to the power. And now to the joint of the new Republic has left them outside of the ring. Of the emergent class they go arising young and political promissory values, but they still lack maturity and a lot of political road to travel. Don't still leave who can end up being in Venezuela a Mikhail Gorbachev or a Nelson Mandela or at least a Mohamed Jatami. But the stomach of our history is surely gestating already him in its interior.

¿More than the same thing but well?

In our opinion it is the scenario in which we will have to work for several years that it doesn't satisfy neither to the radicals of the 'bolivarian revolution' neither to the radicals of the opposition.

Asked the sociologist and priest Mikel of Viana if it houses the hope that Chavez is able to take out Venezuela of this crisis, he responds (*El Nacional*, 11 July 2002):

-That type of questions puts to the priests in corners because everybody wait that the priest says that the faith and the hope are the last thing that gets lost and that we should always cling to a last hope [...] After April 11, this Government gave a turn to the nut and that doesn't have returned behind; this country doesn't believe more a single word that is not accompanied by firm and unanswerable facts. And because we have not seen those facts, there are not reasons to believe that we will find the appropriate path.

To survive without governing

"The success of a ruler can be based more on convincing to the society that the pursued objectives are in the interest of the people". This wise observation of an international politist (Juan J. Linz), allows to our colleague Alfredo Ramos, to affirm that what exists in Venezuela is not more than the permanency of a leader in the government, as well as it was with Fujimori for ten years in Peru, without a modern and efficient administration of the State. They are régimes that move between the mismanagement and the authoritarianism.

"I refer a fujimorist decade in Peru and to what has given in calling himself Chávez's time in Venezuela, as long as experiences that started up with the push of big expectations of change among the citizens, and whose leaders enjoyed of a wide and enough popularity to attack the task of dismantling the old institutions, without hence you have progressed in effective and durable reformations that they

go beyond the permanency of those leaders in the Government" (Ramos, *Nueva Sociedad*, nº 193, 2004).

"The stage from 2002 at 2004 suggests to Ramos a "mismanagement in corners" that it collides with the citizens' frustrated expectations, and according to him it could be defined "as the mismanagement situation that precedes to the definitive outcome of the experiment. In this stage of democratic 'deslegitimation', it goes being discovered the authoritarian nature of the official project".

For other analyst, this situation of "more than the same thing" that could be prolonged with the current one ' bolivarian revolution', "it is that of a country low kidnapping, and that of some citizens that they are simple hostages (M.H. Otero) Venezuela at the moment is under suspicion a kidnapped country. To rescue it is the dilemma that the democratic society of Venezuela and of the continent will have to confront sooner or later" (Consalvi, *El Nacional*, 10 november 2002).

"More than the same thing but well"

It is to continue accompanying, with sacrifices and popular generosity, without still to despair completely, to the 'man of to white horse" (Bolivar) after a dream, of a "romantic irrationality" that he promises a lot and perhaps don't end up being captured in realities.

This phenomenon of distortion of the reality and of vocation of fantasy is the revolutionary mentality, characterized primarily by its voluntarism and its zeal in imposing to the other ones the designs of a dream. The revolutionaries don't live for the present, and the past anything teaches them; their actions are centered in the conquest of a future as impossible as hazy, but whose utopian attractiveness generates the commitment of the militants, of the eternal ones dreamer that again collapses in the disappointment.

"The chavism doesn't have an architectural will but heroic one, and Chavez's defeat won't be that of a mere politician, but that of hero's apprentice who tried to make of his fight a scenic act, a theater"(A. Romero).

With high dose of pragmatism, when concluding the year 2007 -not easy dreamers for an happy end neither radical pessimists by the other one- we can summarize the current joint, in sentence of Otero, two years ago (*El Nacional*, 24 December):

"To the domain of the political power, the President adds the economic capacity of the State, in a moment of oil high prices. No leader had those immense resources before at your disposal, neither he enjoyed the 'discrecionalidad' with which is administered. This is another of the big challenges that the boss of the State will confront next year."

The sailing that comes making the ship of the Venezuelan society, with little compass and a dreamer one grasped to the helm, it has shown to be in very risky 10 years. The ship is exposing, with serious risk, of returning bits when being hit against one of the two cliffs for among those that it goes crossing: classic Escila and Caribdis. On one hand the radical extremism of the Castro-communism and on the other hand the extremism of the opposition. Little before exploding fatal Spanish Civilian War, a moderate statesman, Manuel Azaña, prevented about the sectarian passions that already denounced the explosion that will cost more than a million lives to children of the same homeland :

"No politics can be founded in the decision of exterminating the opponent; because morally it is an abomination, but because, also, it is materially impossible; and the blood wrongly poured by the hate, with extermination purpose, it reborns and it sprouts and it fructifies in curse fruits; curse, don't have more than enough those that spilled it, unfortunately, but on the own country

that has absorbed it to make matters of the misfortune worse."

(Mentioned for Ricardo Combellas, *El Nacional*, 21 May 2002)

¿Will we continue seeing pass the "stultifera navis?"

Before the polarization of the country and the game fixed -when we all conform the pack of cards and the table and the players and nobody can throw- it seems that it is not already but the ominous resource of seeing pass the waves of the events, with their outrages and hurtful results, and to tolerate while they don't play us closely, correcting the errors, in a fatalistic or faithful wait of better times.

In the XV century, German Sebastian Brant, wrote with a lot of irony an imaginative allegory titled the "Stultifera navis" (the ship of the lunatics). He invited to raise some a hundred representative characters of their time on board, famous for their excesses, mistakes and ravings that hit many. And they were invited to travel to the "paradise of the lunatics." For a good historian this allegory illustrates the condemnation of Venezuela well to go and to come, to knit and to unweave, to make and to undo of its history, when the lunatics take turns to the helm of the ship" (S.A. Consalvi, *El Nacional*, 10 December 2000).

"In that way, the history transforms into litany, and of litany in penance. We travel, this way, in Sebastian's ship Brant. If they say that they are federalists, we will say that we are centralists. If I privatize, you nationalize. If they are IV Republicans, we will say that we are of V. If they are friends from Carthage, we will say that we are friends from Rome. If they drink beer, we will drink rum. If they are friends of the Church, we will be the devil's friends. If they postulate the representative democracy, we will lift up the 'protagonistic' democracy. The condemnation of to go and to come, of giving turns on

oneself point believing that we are conquering the moon, it is not another thing that the history that repeats, but we don't know it. We always believe that we are innovating, or discovering unknown lands, to the conquest of the paradise."

Something and a lot it could improve

•National great Mission against the corruption and the poverty

If there is official political will, better controls, efficient and honest public administration of the oil enormous resources that is receiving the State, you can advance a lot in the extirpation of the poverty. If not in six years, at least in twenty years, Venezuela could end up being not the "island of the Caribbean happiness", but possibly a Switzerland continental model.

•A reliable CNE

With the National Assembly that continues being totally obedient, a political sincere will of the régime, it could sit down the legal bases for an Electoral new National Council, just as it contemplates it the effective Constitution (articles 294-296). So CNE guarantees to all the citizens -without excluding that majority of more than 50% that is not official- transparency, impartiality, genuineness and trust for future elections of wide representation and civic participation (not that squalid 25% of the elections of the 4 December 2005). A 'legitimatory' process that requires to eliminate the 7 sins capitals of CNE soon: 1. It has not been named according to their laws 2. It tolerates the official open advantage in the electoral campaign 3. It accepts an unconstitutional system as that of the Brunette ones and with it eliminates the proportional representation 4. It imposes the use of machines that violate the secret of the vote 5. It redefines illegally and with dark purposes the electoral circuits 6. It insists, against the Law, in restricting the access to the Electoral

Registration 7. It determines to eliminate the manual scrutiny of the voting tickets illegally.

And it should have an inclusion sincerely in the process of the important following national agents' change and unique popular actors.

•*Inclusion of the Church*

The Catholic Church, with its thousand millions of faithful all over the world and 20 fulfilled centuries of a pastoral and undeniable action (that it has not succumbed before powerful enemies in different times and countries), it represents today in Venezuela one of the most stable, beneficent and appreciated institutions. Besides its religious specific mission, it comes completing a task like "humanity's teacher", in social complementary areas to those of the State, like education, health, woman's promotion, care of the childhood, leaders' formation and voice of those that don't have voice.

The Venezuelan Church overcome the serious crises of the XIX century, especially the persecution and spoil that it was victim in the era Guzman Blanco (to see Hermann González Oropeza 1990: *The Church in the crisis of the XIX century*) and it liberated of the Patronage that still crawled from the Colony (Hermann GONZÁLEZ 1988: *The liberation of the Venezuelan Church of the Patronage*). The Venezuelan Church began toward 1930 a dynamic time, instigator of modernity, without economic neither political interests, of respectful collaboration of the Venezuelan State. At the end of the years 60, it entered of full in the renovation and change of the Vatican II° Council (with its pluralism and bigger tune in to the contemporary world), just as it was applied Latin America by the Second Conference of the Latin American Bishops (Medellín 1968), with the emphasis to the promotion of the Justice and the commitment with the poor. Difficulty a régime that affirms to be applying democratic values and socialists could find a more good, more serious, more disinterested, more

organized and more experienced collaboration for its social programs than the Catholic Church (that is applicable to other religious confessions). Because it has an enviable diocese net, parishes, priests, religious, lay and youths committed in works of popular nature. We recommend the reading of the Exhortation, in 22 points, to all the Venezuelans made by the Plenary Assembly of the Episcopal Venezuelan Conference, the day July 7 the 2007.

•*Inclusion of unions*

The union base that was given from its origin Democratic Action (AD), like instrument of popular support and political mobilization, with the name of CTV (Confederation of Workers from Venezuela) was one of the pillars (together with the unions of other parties) for the operation during 40 years of the populist "system of reconciliation of elites" that characterized to the financier democracy. The country is requiring of a tolerant handling, plural and respectful of the majority will of unions and workers, of all the intermediate associations of the Venezuelan society, as regular channels of social participation and politics for the state handling of the very Common one.

•*Inclusion of the media*

The Venezuelan State has own means of information and communication, and it is using them to the maximum of its covering and effectiveness, thanks to the President's mediatic power. But the Executive should respect and even to support the private and mixed means of communication, without attempting to all coast use them for its process. It cannot have real democracy without very informed citizens. The means have to be able to inform with truthfulness and they should can to make it with independence. The closing for administrative via made by the Government of a private, popular channel and of long it dates as RCTV, goes in 'contra via' and it explains the great reaction all around the interior and the exterior of Venezuela.

•*Plain democratic option for the socialism XXI century*

The revolutionary process that the President Chávez attempts to consolidate in Venezuela is labeled as "Socialism XXI century". Something that is not still very defined neither in its objectives, neither in its characteristics, neither in its steps and procedures for its installation. When he promises himself a socialism like ideal or utopia, he is projected a possible society in which perfect equality and justice exist for all the citizens, without it has privileged for their birth, their money or their social class. They are the values of the socialism that we all yearn sincerely, and that they approach a lot to the social values of the Christianity (Pious XI). But when it is about settling down as system a concrete socialism it is necessary to define very well what type of socialism it is wanted and how it is going to be built, assisting to the existent several types of socialism. It is necessary to opt for the guessed right combination -with their corresponding dosage- of two fundamental factors: the *economic* one and the *politician*. ¿Will they be the production means totally in hands of the State? ¿And every one inside a totalitarian system of unique party? ¿Or will there be a mixed economy between the State and the civil Society? ¿And inside a pluralistic democracy? (See our previous topic number 13 "Socialism").

Briefing of the last year

The president Chávez 's ambitious plans to establish to all machine (with 5 potent motors) the socialism of the XXI century gave an Enabling Law as a result on the part of the National Assembly - notable for his long duration and width of granted powers - so that the Executive ordered with free hand all he wanted. Grandiloquent new speeches took place and you threaten to intimidate to the opposition. It was looked for to mobilize the country 'chavista' for a new one 'war' of Santa Inés.

But December 2 2007 took place an earthquake in the public opinion that the government didn't wait. It was a hecatomb the vote that the electoral country deposited peacefully in the urns against the 28 constitutional reformations that the President wanted to impose in two blocks. It was a real defeat, a bitter swig for the Government.

And for the national country a élan of trust and optimism for the future. "The project of transforming Venezuela into a second Cuba was defeated. The feat of the Venezuelans has a historical dimension. It happened for the resolved will and for the I hurtle and the citizen's courage. (Enrique Krauze, The National 7 December 2007)"

In the dawn of December 3, CNE (National Electoral Council) had to recognize that the NO really won the referendum in the two blocks proposed to consideration, there having been 43,8% of abstention. The block A obtained 4.521.494 votes for the NO (50,65%) and the block B 4.539.707 votes for the NO (51.01%).

For the emphasis given to the component of the immediate and indefinite reelection of the leader, the constitutional referendum that included other several proposals (configuration of 'communas', loss of autonomy of the central banking, federated municipalities, decapitation of governments and municipal Mayor's offices, abolition of the private property to attempt other 'you form', confederation with other countries.) the electoral convocation became - in fact - in a true plebiscite: to favor (IF) or against (NO) the president Chávez. And in this referendum, the Commandant suffered a double it defeats. Electorally it lost in the urban main centers, and especially in the popular quarters. Politically, the failure was worse: 28% of voters hardly voted in favor of its proposal. And to make matters worse, more than 3 million chavistas they gave him the back: they changed or, in fact, they never existed in the previous elections although they were counted.

They melted, this way, the motors of the revolution. It was a complete setback for the beautiful revolution. It was what an orthodox Marxist would call "a strategic setback". The vote for the an overwhelming rejection went to the aberrant authoritarianism, to the galloping corruption, to the criminal inattention of the basic necessities of the population's weaker and more vulnerable sectors. The socialism of the XXI century lost viability in its own epicenter. And many bolivarian myths collapsed. Among them the Boss's invincibility. It was evidenced that Chávez is electorally defeatable. And the opposition took out the great lesson that to win an election it is necessary to take out more votes than the contrary one, without being allowed to intimidate neither to make feel inferior. The myth was broken from the irrestrict popular support to the régime and

the so mentioned nonexistence and harmless presence of the students, of the workers, of the Church, of the means.

In the new one 2008 the quick waste process continued in that the country has come. The Survey National Pulse of Data accuses an increase of the number of having disenchanted with the régime: of 55% in the year 2007 to 76% in the 2008 (The National , 18 March 2008). The sustained deterioration of the economy, the lack of basic products, the bolted inflation, the personal insecurity, the inefficiency of the public management reveal the muscle loss to take a communism ahead to the Cuban. The depth of the crisis will force to rectify. Otherwise, the uncertainty will make headstrong the country.

The president Chávez seeks to pay remiss attention of the valid pronouncement that made him the country in passed December with countable votes. And what already was rejected then he tries to impose it now to the citizenship for "other roads", as laws and practices based on the Enabling famous Law (for example, the new giant reserves military national parallel to FAN, the new curriculum school bolivarian and militarist, the total hegemony on the means, the capricious distribution of the budget.)

Partial conclusion

The 2 December of the 2008, Venezuela of the sovereign people left very clear and overwhelming that:

- 1° don't want to be socialist;
- 2° hate to be forced similar to Cuba;
- 3° reject the perennial presidencies;
- 4° prefer them to govern it for the Constitution of 1999 and not for enabling laws

"In his delirium to make precedently of Venezuela and the region that paradise of the real socialism unsuccessful in 40 countries, Chávez takes 9 years disarticulating, deforming or destroying manu militari the independence of all the public powers, the

education and the social morals, the institutional and political-territorial foundations, FAN, the market economy, the oil industry and the public country property, the syndicalism, the freedom of speech, the decentralization and the autonomies, built by the democracy. He has built little and bad but he has destroyed very much, violating with system and method the own Constitution (Antonio Pasquali, The National 27 April 2008)."

"The error was not in the legitimate aspirations, but in the false roads to arrive to them, without good management, neither productivity. The illness has remedy, but neither the doctor, neither the medicine serves" (Luis Ugalde, s.j., The National 27 April 2008).